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Introduction: European integration in a global setting  
 
Economically, the last fifty years of European integration have brought about an 
unparalleled process of economic development, of social transformation and employment 
creation. Economic development in Europe has been spurred by the opening up of 
national markets and the harmonization, still incomplete in many sectors, of the European 
Single Market; by monetary and fiscal convergence with the introduction of the Growth 
and Stability Pact accompanying the introduction of the euro; by regional cohesion 
policies with the transfer of substantial amounts of resources between member states 
towards less favoured regions and countries; and by a series of subsequent enlargements 
making the European Union today the largest trading block in the world.  
 
At the same time though, the last ten to fifteen years have also been characterized by an 
unparalleled process of economic growth at the world level, in actual annual growth terms 
at a substantially higher percentage than that of the EU, and accompanied by a dramatic 
expansion of world trade and world wide capital movements. Compared to the 
enlargement of the EU, the enlargement of the WTO with some of the large BRIC 
countries has had by any measure a much greater impact on world wide growth or for that 
matter EU growth. As Richard Freeman put it, the entry of the BRIC countries in the 
world trade system has, given the size of their potential labour force, effectively meant a 
doubling of the “world” labour force. The impact on the rest of the world of such a 
dramatic expansion in opportunities for trading and specialization is likely to involve a 
long adjustment period, estimated by Freeman at more than thirty years.  
 
It is of course somewhat of a paradox that at the time of the Lisbon summit, with its 
strong focus on Europe’s internal competitiveness, so little attention was paid to this 
global transformation with the spreading of knowledge to new, emerging economies and 
the implications that would have for Europe’s future position in the emerging global 
knowledge economy. Since the Lisbon summit in March 2000, it is probably fair to say 
that the largest part of world wide economic growth has been associated with an 
acceleration in the diffusion of technological change and in world wide access to 
knowledge, as opposed to individual countries’ domestic efforts in knowledge 
accumulation. Maybe surprising in view of the particular attention given to domestic, 
European knowledge accumulation in the Lisbon agenda, most of the recent growth 
evidence of both the BRIC countries and EU member countries points to the particular 
importance of the international dimensions of knowledge accumulation. Undoubtedly, 
and as was actually acknowledged in the Lisbon agenda, the emerging digital 
technologies and in particular the easy and cheap access to broadband, the world wide 
spreading of internet and of mobile communication have been instrumental in bringing 
about a more rapid and more global diffusion of best practice technologies, and in 
particular more capital and organizational embedded forms of technology transfer such as 
licences, foreign direct investment and other forms of formal and informal knowledge 
diffusion, no longer limited to the OECD world but involving now systematically the 
BRIC countries.  
Today after not even a decade in the new millennium, it has become clear that Europe is 
just one region in the world with a number of specific characteristics which render it 
particularly vulnerable to the emerging global competition. Those characteristics have 
become well recognized over the last years, which were, however, already well-known 
at the time of Lisbon. Demographic factors - including an ageing population in most EU 
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member states coupled with low fertility rates - are insufficient to sustain European 
employment levels in the long term. Economic, social and cultural factors with 
seemingly natural limits to the further scale advantages which could be reaped from 
further European integration – the European Union given its cultural, language, regional 
diversity resembles anything but a United States of Europe. And last but not least 
national, member countries govern in areas which appear today key to global 
competitiveness, such as education and training, research and development, innovation 
and entrepreneurship with many overlapping tools, let alone any clear concept of 
subsidiarity governing European or national versus regional policy making.  
The focus in this paper is on the external challenges confronting the EU in turning 
Lisbon from an inward-looking, “domestic paradigm” into an “international cooperative 
one” (Courela, 2007). In line with the Lisbon strategy, the focus here will be on policies 
addressing knowledge creation, use and diffusion, and their impact on economic, social 
and environmental welfare. This paper is accompanied by similar papers focusing on 
the political dimension (Mario Telo, 2007), international relations (Álvaro Vasconcelos) 
and sustainable development (Ian Begg).  
In a first section, a brief analytical elaboration is presented on the reasons why the 
Lisbon agenda in 2000 did not address many of the emerging globalization issues. 
Viewed in retrospect, Lisbon appears primarily focused on the enhancement of the 
internal growth dynamics within the EU (Rodrigues, 2002). To some extent, it could be 
argued today that the Lisbon 2000 summit represented the final, major EU attempt at 
formulating a set of combined European and national members policy priorities with 
respect to domestic European knowledge creation and its diffusion, and social and 
macro-economic policies aimed at bringing about more European growth dynamics. A 
final attempt at inward-looking integration setting out for the early 21st Century the 
European dream “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth region with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion”: the crowning, but implicitly also, the coming to 
an end of 50 years of policy priority to European internal integration.  
That process of economic integration could, again with hindsight, be viewed as one 
characterized primarily by the success and failure of European industrial policy. 
Industrial policy addressing what was perceived after the second world war as Western 
and Eastern Europe’s central problem compared to the US or the Soviet Union, namely 
that of scale. Scale in production as in the case of the European Community on Steel 
and Coal Mining or agricultural production as in the case of the Community 
Agricultural Policy. And later on, with the major Delors initiative, scale in trade 
integration and harmonization amongst the EU member countries as in the case of the 
Single Market. As in the US and Japan, industrial policy shifted in the 70’s away from 
so-called “rust belt” sectors towards new “sun rise” industries such as the 
semiconductors and electronics industries. It led to the acknowledgement of the 
strategic importance of R&D investments and European R&D networking and alliances 
and more recently higher education.  
However, as discussed in the second section of this paper, the ICT knowledge paradigm 
confronted Europe also with new international challenges, which didn’t really enter the 
European policy discussion. In the case of the semi-conductors industry for instance, the 
growing competition from Asian countries such as China with even bigger scale 
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advantages than the US, challenged the European integration focus on scale. The 
semiconductors scale advantage which had been greatly enhanced in Europe by GSM 
mobile phone demand, effectively the killer applications for semiconductor producing 
firms in Europe in the 90’s, became challenged. Even the biggest European alliances, 
such as the one in Crolles (France) grouping the remaining European semiconductor 
producers, could not resist the international pressures to outsource manufacturing 
production to Asia. The remaining semiconductor firms became so-called “fabless” 
specializing in semiconductor design and development, but no longer in its mass 
production.  
Similarly, in the case of ICT applications in services, Europe appeared confronted with 
major difficulties in reaping the efficiency gains of such applications. Apart from the 
negative impact of national regulations and the lack of a single market in services with 
the final consensus agreement on a revised services directive only achieved in 2006, in 
many sectors the characteristic increasing return network features associated with the 
delivery of services appeared impossible to become realized in a European context of 27 
member countries with differences, not just in regulatory regimes, but also in languages, 
cultures, tastes and habits. These ICT and other challenges question to some extent the 
geographical nature itself of European economic integration. Suddenly, Europe appears 
to have become much more borderless, its growth and dynamics becoming more 
dependent on external forces and growth opportunities than on its internal dynamics.  
In the third section, we draw, albeit very briefly in just a couple of pages, some of the 
most striking similarities and differences with the Chinese situation. Maybe surprisingly 
to a European reader, the Chinese challenges with respect to knowledge creation and 
knowledge diffusion appear up to a level very similar to those of the EU. The 
importance of local governments in the Chinese innovation system, result e.g. in a R&D 
funding system whereby both central and local governments similar to the EU and the 
EU member states have each their own emphases on funding S&T programs, based on 
own fiscal revenues. Thus like in the case of the EU Framework Programmes, there are 
in China central government S&T programs, such as the Key Technology R&D 
program, the 863 program and the 973 program. However, many others are by and large 
funded by local governments and enterprises participating in the programs. For instance, 
the fiscal appropriation from the central government to the Spark program never 
surpassed 5 percent of total funding in the 1990s, a figure very similar to the percentage 
of EU R&D appropriation compared to those of the national member countries.  
 
But whereas in the case of the EU, the fiscal diversity between member states in 
funding R&D is so to say politically embedded in the limits and contours of the 
economic and monetary union whereby the limits of further fiscal integration are, as it 
were encapsulated in the various EU treaties3, the Chinese bottom up, economically 
driven, fiscal federalization has lead to an accentuation in the regional disparities of 
R&D funding. Thus, in China’s most developed regions, such as the Guandong and 
Zhejiang provinces, local governments have a much larger R&D budget than their 
counterparts in the less-developed provinces and regions. Their enterprises and 
scientific institutions have also more opportunities to receive central and private funding 
for their innovation activities. Some of those well endowed provincial governments 
have even set up their own natural science foundation to support basic research in the 
                                                 
3 Effectively shifting more R&D funding tools to an EU level was actually a central feature of the original 
European Constitution proposals.   
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universities and institutions in their area. By contrast, in many less-developed 
provinces, governments do not have the financial capacity to do so.   
 
In addition to this fiscal federalism, the Chinese political and economic system is also 
characterized by a strong autonomy of local governments. With the large diversity in 
development levels of regions in China, the issues which call for attention from policy 
makers in one region often do not exist in other regions. In areas not regulated by 
national law, local governments can enact regulations overseeing them in their purview. 
A typical example with respect to innovation policy is the regulation on venture capital 
investment. Before a national regulation on venture capital investment came into effect 
on March 1, 2006, at the local level the Shenzhen, Chongqing and Shenyang municipal 
government enacted regulations to promote venture capital development in their 
administrative areas. In this sense, what appeared to be “best practice” innovation 
regulation in the more advanced regions provided experience for the development of 
similar practices in the less-developed regions or in nation-wide action.  
 
In short, both the problems confronting existing (in the case of the EU) and 
growing (in the case of China) inequality between member states/provinces with respect 
to knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion, as well as the appropriate policy 
responses in dealing with such diversity suggest that China and the EU can benefit from 
each others experiences. As argued in section 3, the scope for policy learning is 
enormous.  
We conclude by drawing some broad conclusions as to what all this could mean for the 
EU’s external actions.  
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Section 1: On the long road to Lisbon  
With hindsight, the Lisbon 2000 initiative could be considered as a unique attempt to 
deal with what could be considered an institutional weakness in the formation of the 
European Union. Up to Lisbon there had really been only two areas were, in 
institutional terms, European power was clearly dominant over national member 
countries power: competition policy and monetary policy.  
Competition policy was, and is still, governed, one could argue, by the internal “single 
market” dynamics leading to a continuous broadening of its influence: a systematic 
enlargement of the sphere of the working of market forces. One may think of the 
“services directive” with its attempt at further harmonization of regulatory rules 
regarding the delivery of services or the European patent proposals. While such 
broadening of the sphere of market forces to new sectors has resulted in bringing about 
a major general efficiency enhancing effect across the EU, it has not contributed in any 
direct sense to the process of knowledge accumulation or innovation improvement 
within the EU. On the contrary, in areas of research and innovation, competition policy 
has gradually created growing legal uncertainty with respect to member countries’ own 
R&D and innovation support policies, explaining the Commission efforts over the last 
years to come up with a new State Aid Action Plan and new rules governing R&D and 
innovation support policies. In some member countries there is today concern that some 
of the domestic R&D and innovation support policies might well have been contrary to 
European competition policy rules.  
Monetary policy on the other hand, as implemented by the European Central Bank has 
put priority on coping with the huge diversity in the EU in growth and inflation 
pressures. In doing so, there has again been a sheer natural broadening of the influence 
of monetary policy over domestic member countries’ fiscal policies. The Growth and 
Stability Pact provides Europe with an instrument with which it can determine in purely 
quantitative terms member countries’ fiscal policies. But here too, there is no inherent 
incentive to promote knowledge and innovation as engines of sustainable growth.  
Given these institutional biases, it was not really surprising that the Lisbon agenda of 
knowledge and innovation capacity building in Europe was by and large dependent on 
member countries’ efforts and willingness to give domestic priority to knowledge 
accumulation in all its facets, including innovation and knowledge diffusion, education 
and training. Contrary to the two areas described above, this is an area with ultimately 
little European power over and above member countries.  
Furthermore, the relevant policy areas cover a wide spectrum of policy fields ranging 
from research to education policy, with sometimes little, sometimes growing European 
involvement (as in the case of the European Research Council), sometimes 
implemented in member countries at a purely national level, sometimes executed at a 
purely regional level being governed by regional policies.  
All this has to some extent formed the basis of an overemphasis, one might even say a 
natural obsession, with internal knowledge and innovation accumulation in Europe. It 
has nourished a process of European cocooning in this area. Thus, European and 
national policy concerns have addressed first and foremost the functioning of the 
European research area, the achievement of the Barcelona targets, the comparisons of 
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best practice innovation policies amongst member countries or regions, and many other 
local knowledge accumulation and diffusion bottlenecks. In the meantime though, the 
knowledge and innovation world outside of the European borders has changed 
substantially and is likely to continue to do so in the near future.  
For sure in the future too, there is likely to remain a continuing concentration of 
knowledge creation activities in a small number of regions in the world which will be 
matched by persistent international differences in the share of resources devoted to 
science and technological efforts and R&D in particular. The EU, with the US and 
Japan, should undoubtedly attempt to remain part of that region, with China likely to 
overtake it in the coming decade (see Figure 1: Total Number of Researchers (Full Time 
Equivalent) in Different Countries, 2003 and Figure 2: China’s R&D Expenditure as a 
Percentage of the R&D Expenditure of the US, EU-25 and Japan, 1991–2003 
(Percentage)).  
Yet today, contrary to the old Lisbon 2000 view, it is no longer the concentration of 
such efforts in a particular region of the world which is key to economic growth and 
international competitiveness than the broader local organizational, economic and social 
embedding of new technologies and innovations and the way they unleash or block 
particular specific development and growth opportunities.  
As has become recognized in the endogenous growth literature4, the innovation policy 
challenge appears ultimately closely associated with levels of development. In a high 
income, developed country context, the innovation policy challenge seems increasingly 
directed towards questions about the sustainability of processes of “creative 
destruction” within environments that give increasingly premiums to insiders, to 
security and risk aversion, and to the maintenance of income and wealth. Most of the 
EU’s continental member countries seem to be confronted with that challenge. 
In an emerging, rapid growth catching up environment, as in the case of many of the 
new EU member states, but also China, India, Brazil or Russia, the challenge appears 
directed towards industrial science and technology policies bringing also to the forefront 
the importance of engineering and design skills and accumulating “experience” in 
particular. The Dutch Advisory Council on Science and Technology Policy has coined 
those policies as “backing winners” policies, with the emphasis on backing as opposed 
to picking winners. Here the more intensive international competition following the 
international integration of those countries in the EU or the WTO, has put significant 
new competitive pressures on sectors and firms of those countries.  
And last but not least there are the vast majority of developing countries which appear 
characterized by “disarticulated” knowledge systems, with bits and pieces of the 
knowledge system operating as isolated islands with little or no connection to the rest of 
the economy and higher education systems of generally speaking poor quality. The 
innovation policy challenge here is in its complexity of a completely different order of 
magnitude. 
                                                 
4 This view of the philosophy and aims of innovation policies differing amongst countries according to 
their level of development, reminiscent of many of the arguments of the old infant industry type 
arguments has now become popular in the endogenous growth literature. See Aghion and Howitt (2005).   
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Figure 1: Total Number of Researchers (Full Time Equivalent) in Different Countries, 2003. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculated on the basis of various UNESCO and OECD sources (2003). Estimates made by Nico 
Rasters, UNU-MERIT. 
 
Figure 2: China’s R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of the R&D Expenditure of the US, EU-25 
and Japan, 1991–2003 (Percentage) 
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Section 2:  Opening up Lisbon: towards an external knowledge policy 
perspective  
In this second section, we select a number of areas which appear at first side most in 
need of a further opening up of Lisbon. They are, in our view all key to the Lisbon 
knowledge agenda: the information society with its heavy dependence on network 
service activities, research which increasingly has become a borderless activity, and last 
but not least the international search for brains and talents. Obviously there are many 
others not in the least the challenges with respect to sustainable development whereby 
issues such as climate change and the use of sustainable energy resources rely heavily 
on global responses. These latter issues are not addressed here.  
A. European network services and the global level playing field 
As already highlighted in the introduction, Europe with its differences in cultures, 
languages, political and fiscal governance diversity, historically grown institutions, 
habits and tastes has always been intrinsically at a disadvantage with respect to reaping 
the scale advantages of the internal market in services and in particular network 
services. One may think of finance, insurance and business services, transport, 
wholesale and retail services, telecommunications, media and advertising services as 
well as many public services ranging from health to education. All these service sectors 
have been literally transformed by the application of information and communication 
technologies. At the time of the Lisbon summit also the height of the dot.com boom, a 
lot of attention was given to the enormous growth potential of those service sectors.  
Alongside the European internal discussion about opening up member countries’ 
national markets along the lines of the successful mobile communications liberalization 
process, there was also at the international level, a discussion within the Doha round 
trade negotiations of the so-called Singapore “new regulatory” issues: the setting world 
wide of standards for public procurement, of competition policy, investment policy and 
trade facilitation. Those rules were strongly supported by most European service 
network firms as they would facilitate the access to emerging markets for those firms in 
some of the most rapid growing high tech-service markets world wide such as telecom 
services, but also financial services, even public utility services. Not surprisingly, the 
European Commission took a very positive trade liberalization position in the run up to 
the Doha round trade negotiations on those issues, whereby in the typical quid pro quo 
fashion of trade negotiations, one was prepared to give in on agriculture tariffs in favour 
of trade liberalization in these more dynamic, innovative, service sectors5.  
                                                 
5 In Multilateral trade negotiations under the reciprocity rule, exporters’ will find that their access to 
foreign markets depends on the openness of the home market. “Under the reciprocity rule, trade policy 
formulation appears ultimately a political contest between import competitors and exporters. The central 
point of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is to create a domestic political constituency in favor of openness 
where none had existed before by giving exporters a reason to lobby governments in favor of home 
market liberalization. Hence, in the world of international trade negotiation exporters defend offensive 
interests, import competitors defensive interests.” (Toro, 2006) Under the Doha round which started in 
2001, the EC first took an offensive stand in the agenda setting phase and then shifted after the so-called 
Geneva 2004 meeting towards a much more blocking stand.  
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The underlying motivation for trying to open up those external service trading 
relationships beyond the internal single market but directly at the world WTO level was 
to some extent illustrative of the underlying scale problem at the European level in each 
of those service network sectors. Indeed, the characteristic increasing return features 
associated with the delivery of many of such high-tech network services, can not always 
become fully to fruition within the context of a EU with 27 member countries each not 
just with different regulatory regimes governing some of those networks, but also with 
different languages, different cultures, different tastes and habits. From this perspective, 
the slow progress on the internal market front with respect to services is actually 
illustrative of the intrinsic difficulties to take full advantage of scale in many service 
sectors. By contrast, the international trade negotiations and in particular the trade 
liberalization demands with respect to the “new regulatory issues” did provide a 
welcome complement for European firms to realize at the international rather than just 
at the European level, those increasing returns, scale advantages. The old language and 
cultural links, dating sometimes back to colonial times of many individual EU member 
states with emerging and developing countries, represented for many of those EU 
member states a sheer natural, much more straightforward opportunity for the 
expansions of such service based markets in an international global direction.  
From this perspective one still underestimates the way historically grown international 
links between countries on the basis of old established trade and foreign investment 
relationships have built strong cultural, business and trust relationships. One may think 
of Ericsson’s or Saint-Gobain’s presence in China going back to the 19th Century; 
Belgium’s involvement in constructing Chinese railways early last Century, and of 
course the British and Portuguese presence in Hong-Kong and Macao.  
The ultimate decision to exclude those Singapore issues from the Doha trade 
negotiations taken in 2004, not just shifted the EC’s international trading position into a 
more defensive one, having now to trade for tariff reductions in developing countries in 
non-agriculture manufacturing in return of tariff reductions at home in agriculture, it 
also redirected policy makers’ attention back to European internal trade integration 
issues such as the service directive while indirectly having eliminated some of the much 
more natural global growth opportunity for some of those high tech service sectors 
which had been at the centre of the Lisbon knowledge agenda.  
 
B. From the ERA to “Recherche sans frontières” 
A second area where internal European concerns took over in the aftermath of Lisbon 
was of course investment in knowledge (R&D and innovation) accumulation in the EU 
and its various member states as exemplified by the so-called Barcelona 3% target 
approved in 2001. The latter target centres on the strengthening of the geographical 
determined spill-overs of European, national and regional R&D and Innovation efforts 
(Muldur et al., 2006). However, precisely because of the much higher risks involved in 
developing new products for global markets, firms today will often prefer to license 
such technologies or alternatively outsource locally but also internationally the most 
risky parts to small high tech companies which operate at arms length but can be taken 
over, once successful. Not surprisingly in most EU countries, the large R&D intensive 
firms appear today less interested in increasing their R&D investments in Europe than 
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in consolidating them or where possible reducing the risks involved in carrying out 
R&D by collaboration with others sometimes through publicly sponsored or enabled 
programmes (SEMATEC and IMEC in micro- and today nano-electronics6), or even 
through so-called open innovation collaboration.  
Not surprisingly, many small, traditionally high R&D intensive EU member countries 
have no longer witnessed growth, but sometimes even a decline in their privately 
funded R&D intensity over the last four to five years with ultimately little or no 
relationship to their economic performance. From this perspective, the central question 
appears to be whether the benefits of knowledge investments can be appropriated 
domestically or will “leak away” globally. In the catching-up growth literature, it was 
already emphasized how this phenomenon would be characterized by lagging countries 
benefiting from the import, transfer of technology and knowledge, formally and 
particularly informally. As a logical extension, in the current global world economy, it 
seems obvious that increasing R&D investment is unlikely to benefit only the domestic 
economy. This holds a forteriori for the small EU member countries, but is increasingly 
valid for all EU countries.  
Thus, as Meister and Verspagen (2003) calculated, achieving the 3% Barcelona target in 
the EU by 2010 will ultimately not reduce the income gap between the EU and the US, 
the benefits of the increased R&D efforts not only accruing to Europe but also to the US 
and the rest of the world. In a similar vain, Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen (2004) 
illustrated how the US R&D boom of the 90’s had major benefits for the UK economy 
and in particular for UK firms having shifted their R&D to the US. A UK firm e.g. 
shifting 10% of its R&D activity to the US from the UK while keeping its overall R&D 
expenditures at the same level, would witness an additional increase in productivity of 
about 3%, an effect which appeared to be of the same order of magnitude “as that of a 
doubling in its R&D stock” (Griffith et al. 2004, p.25). In short, the link between the 
location of “national” firms’ private R&D activities and national productivity gains 
appears today increasingly tenuous. 
The same holds for universities and other public research institutes. Ten years ago 
already, one of us (Soete, 1997) pointed to the inherent knowledge “diversion” 
implications of the European research networking and the likely impact this could have 
on European research “cocooning”, as pursued e.g. through the European Framework 
Programmes. Over the years the gradual broadening of research priority areas to include 
both local as well as global long term issues has raised increasingly questions about the 
European territorial nature of such EU sponsored research and has ultimately led to the 
European Framework Programmes becoming increasingly shared and open in 
                                                 
6 A look at the world’s nanotechnology publications (indexed by Web of Science) highlights the 
increasingly global nature of nanotechnology research. In 2006 the U.S produced 26 percent of the 
world’s nanotechnology publications, China and Japan respectively 19 percent and 11 percent. By 
contrast the large European countries such as Germany, France and the U.K. accounted for respectively 9, 
6 and 5 percent. The increasingly dispersed global nanotechnology R&D activities and the strengthened 
commitments of various national governments to nanotechnology funding indicate that nanotechnology 
R&D in Europe will not advance in an isolated way, but will have to rely on international cooperation and 
collaboration.  
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participation and external co-funding to researchers from non EU countries. The next 
step should be a complete opening up.   
Indeed, in many research areas, European welfare will in the long term be directly 
influenced not so much by the development of local knowledge through national of EU 
sponsored research programs but by global access to such knowledge, the development 
of joint global standards and the rapid world-wide diffusion of such new technologies to 
other, non-EU countries. One may think of energy saving technologies, research on 
sustainable development and climate change, health and the spreading of diseases, food 
safety, security, social sciences and humanities, etc. In all these areas, the urgent need 
for global solutions to safeguard in the long term European welfare, warrant a more 
open research approach less concerned with the local, national or European returns to 
European tax payers’ money than with the search for shared solutions to common 
problems.   
 
C. The global search for talent 
The third area in need of external action is possibly the most challenging one. One of 
the most fundamental differences between the EU and the US and many emerging 
economies is the ageing of its highly skilled work-force. Europe could possibly learn in 
this respect more from countries such as Japan and Russia with similar demographic 
challenges.  
The international dimension of a future European Lisbon education and employment 
strategy will have to deal with the growing international competition for access to 
brains. Access to brains should be understood here in its broadest definition: access to 
talent as an essential ingredient in research, innovation and entrepreneurship; access to 
more routine technical skills as one element in a broader strategy to tackle growing 
labour shortages in particular skill categories; and access to more personal skills as 
Europe’s population grows older and the demand for health and care support services 
will consequently grow dramatically.  
Access to brains has of course been an essential historical feature of development and 
knowledge transfer within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world. Many 
European countries have moved from a situation of emigrating countries to immigrating 
countries, with Ireland probably as the most extraordinary case. At the same time, the 
migration of skilled labour from developing countries to developed countries has 
increased significantly. The issue has been referred as ‘brain drain’ as well as brain 
exchange or brain circulation. ‘Brain circulation’ is defined as the cycle of moving 
abroad to study, then taking a job abroad, and later returning home to take advantage of 
the skills acquired abroad to enhance domestic job opportunities. “Brain exchange” is 
defined as a two-way flow of expertise between a sending country and a receiving 
country. Where the net flow is heavily biased in one direction, the term "brain drain" 
has been used.     
Brain drain acts as a double-edged sword on poverty: it increases further inequality at 
home and slows down economic growth. On the other hand there is also a positive 
effect of migration prospects on human capital formation itself in the sending country. 
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The possibility of emigrating to higher wage countries may stimulate persons to pursue 
higher education in the hope of improving their expected wages abroad.  This might 
cause sending countries to benefit from skilled emigration because it induces the 
remaining native population to pursue higher education, and might ultimately lead to a 
process of brain circulation, as in the case of Korea in the past and China today.  
From the point of view of receiving countries though, and the EU in particular, skilled 
migration is always important not just for the growth of the economy but also because 
of more general benefits like entrepreneurship, the contributions to an increasing 
demand for goods and services, attraction of new capital, etc. The foreign environment 
offers new alternative possibilities for initiative taking and entrepreneurship. In short 
immigration, the external appeal for brains and talent should be fully part of the Lisbon 
agenda, as should be the challenges it raises in some of the sending countries (one may 
think of the large numbers of nurses emigrating from South Africa).  
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Section 3: Opportunities and challenges for mutual learning: China and the 
EU  
As argued in the Introduction, in a certain way China resembles the EU both in terms of 
its political and economic system, and in terms of the nature of the policy challenges it 
faces. However, as we will discuss below the Chinese policy actions to tackle these 
challenges are not always similar as those implemented in the EU. In this sense the 
similarities and diversity between China and the EU in the policy responses to the 
challenges of the emerging global knowledge economy provide ample opportunities for 
mutual learning. Given the limited space within the framework of this paper, we limit 
ourselves to three particular major challenges directly related to the knowledge 
economy which China is currently facing and the policy responses that have been 
gradually introduced over the last decade.  
 
Again we do not focus here on some of the most urgent issues with respect to 
sustainable development, even though they provide possible the most direct and 
immediate opportunities for mutual learning and joint initiatives both with respect to 
knowledge creation and knowledge diffusion. It has been recently argued (Economy, 
2007) that environmental degradation and pollution cost the Chinese economy between 
8 and 12% of gross domestic product annually. As the recent flooding in the UK and 
burning in Greece disasters illustrated, Europe too is suffering from climate induced 
natural disasters and environmental degradation. Achieving sustainable development is 
a major common concern, but it will be clear that in the case of a rapidly growing 
economy such as China, the challenge will be much more formidable.  
 
 
A. Regional disparity in growth and development 
 
Similar to the EU, with its combined dual efforts of public knowledge investments at 
individual member state level and at the European level through the funds allocated 
through EU-wide research, innovation and economic development programmes (such as 
the Framework Programmes, the ERC, Regional cohesion policies, etc.), local 
governments alongside the central government do play an important role in the Chinese 
innovation system. Indeed, the Chinese fiscal system is a federal tax system: national 
and local taxes are collected separately by different tax bureaus and central and local 
governments have each their own policies of public support for research, innovation and 
economic development. Such fiscal federalization unavoidably leads to strong regional 
disparities in terms of R&D funding. In an economically developed region, local 
governments will have larger R&D budget than the counterparts in the under-developed 
regions. The Chinese political and economic system is in other words strongly 
characterized by the autonomy of local governments. For local affairs which are not 
regulated by a national law or regulation, local governments can enact regulations and 
oversee them in their purview.  
 
Fiscal federalism and autonomy of local governments in funding innovation activities 
are likely to bring about a segmentation of S&T and innovation resources, as is 
manifested in the differences in availability of and access to large scientific apparatus, 
experiment instruments and databases. Experimental instruments purchased by different 
institutions and organizations in China are typically not used to be shared with others. 
Scientific database and data are isolated by the institutions which created or purchased 
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them. The segmentation of the S&T resources and infrastructure inevitably gives rise to 
replicate purchase and waste of limited funding. The Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of 
Education and Ministry of Finance launched an initiative in 2004 which aimed to 
integrate all investment on S&T infrastructure and promote the efficient usage of 
existent S&T resources. This so-called “S&T infrastructures and Platform 
Development” initiative built six platforms to promote shared usage of research centers, 
large scientific apparatus and experiment instruments, scientific databases and literature, 
share technology transfer project information and build up network for scientific 
research (Table 1).  
 
 
Table 1 The Initiative of S&T Infrastructure and Platform Development of MOST  
Platform Characteristics 
Platform for shared usage of 
research centers and large 
scientific apparatus and 
experiment instruments 
  Collect the information of scientific apparatus 
which are worth more than 500 thousand RMB 
each and promote the shared usage of them; 
  Manage the current research centers in line with 
the principle of “open, mobile, unity and 
competition”; 
  Build up a network of field observatories; 
  Harmonize the technological standards and 
inspection systems. 
Platform for shared usage of 
natural resources 
  Promote shared usage of resources of germ 
plasm of plant and animal, microorganism, 
human and animal genetic resources, specimen 
and cell bank etc. 
Platform for sharing scientific 
data and database 
  Construct data centers to promote sharing the 
scientific data in the field of meteorology, 
topography, earthquake, hydrology, forestry, 
oceanography, geology etc.; 
  Establish 11 websites and databases for the 
research in different fields. 
Platform for sharing scientific 
literature 
  Promote the shared usage of scientific literature, 
patent information and technological standards. 
Platform for technology transfer 
  Establish an information network of available 
opportunities of technology transfer. 
  Establish a network for disseminating 
information about technological standards. 
Network Platform for scientific 
research 
  Build up a network supporting the 
abovementioned platforms; 
  Establish a connected computation system; 
  Establish a telecommuting network system for 
scientific research; 
  Set up a on-line museum for science education; 
  Establish a website providing information 
service related to science and technology. 
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The similarity in both the purpose and policy tools proposed in the European Union 
under the different Framework Program (FP) with its by now well accepted concepts 
such as the so-called Technology Platforms (under FP6) or the new Joint Technology 
Initiatives (under FP7), with the proposed Chinese MOST platform tools is striking. 
There is consequently a lot to be learnt from comparative evaluation exercises between 
the EU and China of such policy tools aimed at more research networking and less 
research overlap. There is also scope for analyses of best practice policies in some of 
those areas.  
 
Addressing the growing regional disparities seems form this perspective a common 
policy concern. The EU is unique in having addressed the enormous diversity in income 
and development levels through a system of structural funds being made available for 
the least developed regions for infrastructural and intangible investments. It has to do so 
the availability of its own financial arm, the European Investment Bank. The use of 
such funds has effectively meant the transfer of resources between its member states 
with the explicit purpose to help less favoured regions to develop and adjust their 
industrial structure. The gradual enlargement of the EU has undoubtedly put this system 
under strain, but it has remained a unique policy tool, going beyond the direct economic 
advantages for least favoured regions, but also contributing to the social cohesion of 
those regions by reducing the emigration pressures towards richer, more economically 
successful regions, and so also maintaining some of the regional cultural identities. In 
this sense the EU experience is very different from that of the US: internal migration 
within the EU has remained by and large limited to the most skilled part of the 
population, including students. At the same time, the regional diversity both in 
language, taste and habits discussed in the previous section on network services has 
remained a major factor behind the lack of mobility within the EU. In short, whereas the 
economic catching up of the new member countries has been spurred by economic 
integration and the inflow of private foreign direct investment, European regional 
policies have helped offset some of the resulting emerging regional disparities within 
and between EU member countries. In doing so they have helped reducing some of the 
resulting migration pressures while at the same time strengthened the local identity of 
those regions with the European Union.  
 
With the significant growth in disparity in economic development emerging in China 
across its regions and provinces following the rapid catching up of the most well 
endowed and well located regions to world productivity and income levels, there is 
scope here for policy learning from the European experience. The latter for sure has also 
been confronted with major difficulties, but is still one of the unique corner stones of 
the European economic integration process as opposed to other regional economic trade 
or monetary integration zones.  
 
 
 
B. Transforming low-wage manufacturing sectors to innovation-based industries 
 
The success of the Chinese economic reforms and the growth of China’s national 
innovation capability since the 80’s can be partly attributed to the policy of welcoming 
foreign direct investment (FDI) (Liu and Wang, 2003; Buckley et al., 2002). However, 
many critics pointed out that the huge inflow of FDI also came at a price namely that 
China is heavily dependent on foreign technology and that the rapid expansion of 
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Chinese exports over the last decade is largely based on the growth of low-wage 
manufacturing sectors (Gilboy, 2004). Actually, in 2002 China became the world’s 
largest recipient of FDI, receiving nearly $53 billion (OECD, 2003a). China attracted 
FDI by providing physical and institutional infrastructures, as well as fiscal incentives. 
The Chinese central government has more or less continuously implemented tax 
advantages and deduction policies targeting foreign investors, but has gradually shifted 
the target of preference fiscal policy from low-tech and labour-intensive sectors to high-
tech manufacture and service sectors. For example, in July 2003 MOST and the 
Ministry of Commerce developed a list of favourable high-tech products where FDI 
would be encouraged. In July 2007, the Ministry of Commerce and Central 
Administration of Customs amended the list of low-tech commodities whose production 
would be restricted in China. The amendment of the list limits the development of 
foreign firms engaged in low-tech manufacturing business in the eastern coastal area, 
but promotes the development of domestic manufacturers in the central and western 
regions, where the economy is relatively under-developed. The number of goods in the 
previous list was merely 394, but it was increased to 2247 in the new version of the list. 
The amendment marks a drastic change of the Chinese policy towards the trading of 
low-tech processing industry goods and sent a clear signal that low-tech FDI is no 
longer favourable in China any more.  
 
In addition to regulating foreign investment, the Chinese government strengthened its 
support to the innovation activities carried out in enterprises. The 863 program, as one 
of the main three S&T funding programs supported by the central government, 
increasingly provides more funding to the projects conducted in the industry after 2001. 
In 2001, 14 percent of program funding went to enterprises. However, in 2004, the ratio 
increased to 35.3 percent. The prevalent business support structures such as science 
parks and incubators also now exist widely in China. By 2002, at the national level 
alone over 400 business incubators and 53 high-technology development zones had 
been developed through governmental support, mainly through the Torch Program. In 
2005, 41990 enterprises operated in the 53 national high-tech development zones across 
the country, hiring 5.2 million employees and achieving an industrial added value of 
some 682 billion RMB. The R&D expenditure by the enterprises in the zones was 80.6 
billion RMB, accounting for 2.8 percent of their sales value. MOST estimated that 
about one third of China’s R&D expenditure was spent on the projects run in the 
development zones. 
 
To finance innovation, China also aimed to establish a viable financial system, and 
particularly a venture capital system, to support technology-based Small and Medium 
sized Enterprises (SMEs). There was no comprehensive regulation or law overseeing 
domestic venture capital investment in China until 2006. Meanwhile, some legislative 
proposals for venture capital law were submitted to the national legislation authority, 
and at the local level the Shenzhen, Chongqing, Shenyang municipal government 
enacted some local regulations to regulate and promote venture capital development in 
their administrative areas. On March 1, 2006, Provisional Regulation on Venture 
Capital Investment enacted by 10 ministries and central government agencies under the 
coordination of the National Development and Reform Committee came into effect. It 
was the first Chinese nation-wide regulation on venture capital investment and 
enterprises, with an explicit objective to promote the development of venture capital and 
SMEs, particularly high-tech SMEs.  
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Very recently local governments and state-owned organizations started to play an active 
role in establishing introductory fund to support venture capital investment. China 
Development Bank and China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park co-invested 1 billion 
RMB to form a venture capital fund in March 2006. Shanghai Pudong district municipal 
government set up a 1 billion RMB fund to support venture capital investment in 
Pudong district. The funds are not used to invest directly in start-ups, but to co-establish 
new funds in collaboration with private capital. In a new fund, the proportion of the 
funding from Pudong government in principal will not surpass 33 percent. The Pudong 
government did not aim to profit from the operation of the fund, instead, it meant to 
leverage and attract private capital to invest in venture capital projects in Pudong 
district. 
 
Compared to the difficulties of the EU in progressing alongside its Lisbon goals and the 
soft policy tools at its disposal with respect to the different member states such as the 
Open Method of Coordination, the voluntaristic Chinese policy measures taken over the 
last couple of years in trying to shift its economy in the direction of more value added 
high tech sectors, highlight some of the intrinsic advantages of a command economy, 
which are of course not available within the context of the EU. However, some of the 
Chinese policy measures with respect to the nature of FDI or the indirect involvement 
with the creation of a financial venture system, point to missed opportunities within the 
EU in using more effectively both its regional structural funds in preventing e.g 
competition between regions in attracting FDI and in using more effectively the 
financial instruments it has at its disposal such as the EIB. In short, there are, despite the 
enormous difference in the nature of the economic system, lessons to be learnt from the 
Chinese approach to its transition to the knowledge economy for Europe.  
 
 
C. Deepening the linkage between industry and academy in innovation activities 
 
Strengthening the industry-academy relationship was prioritized in the agenda of the 
Chinese policy making quite early on, already in the late 80s. The government designed 
the so-called push- and pull-side policies to develop specific linkages between industry 
and academia.  
 
On the one hand, the “push-side” policy executed in the 1980s gradually reduced the 
government’s budgetary appropriation to the S&T institutes. This strategy succeeded to 
force institutes to turn towards enterprises to earn revenue. The technical service 
provided to enterprises and the joint R&D projects financed by industry became more 
important to S&T institutes because they brought in an increasing proportion of the total 
revenue of institutes. Xue (1997) reported that the ratio of government appropriation to 
the budget of S&T institutes decreased by 5 percent on average each year from 1986 to 
1993. After 1985, S&T institutes, especially those doing experiment and development 
were encouraged to merge into enterprises. The newest round of reform after 1999 even 
went further to transform hundreds of S&T institutes into enterprises or non-profit 
organizations (Huang et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the government concentrated its funding 
on the unchanged institutes that primarily conducted basic research. 
 
On the other hand, the “pull-side” policy focused on the establishment of the 
intermediary organizations which facilitated the technology transfer from academia to 
industry. The transfer was promoted by the “Technology Contract Law” taking effect on 
 20
Nov. 1, 1987 and the subsequent relevant regulations. After twenty years’ development, 
a national system of intermediary organizations at the national, provincial, municipal 
and county levels is now relatively well established. It consists of technology markets, 
productivity promotion centres and technology consulting organizations, etc. In the end 
of 2004, more than 1500 technology markets at the different levels operated in China. 
There were more than 1200 organizations established responsible for registering and 
certifying technology transfer contracts. Over the past decades, the contract value 
registered in technology markets grew from 700 million RMB in 1984 to 123.4 billion 
RMB in 2004, at an annual rate of 15 percent. In addition, the spin-off enterprises were 
also strongly promoted by the government. Chinese spin-off enterprises showed 
particular dynamism in their access to new technology, efficient corporate governance, 
aggressive business strategies and strong learning capabilities (Lu, 2001).  
 
Like in the EU, joint technology centres have been promoted more recently by the 
government as a means of strengthening the innovation activities in enterprises and 
improving the industry-academy relationship. An initiative of 2007 led by central 
government agencies under the coordination of MOST established four R&D and 
innovation consortia in the sectors of steel, energy, agriculture equipment and 
exploration of coal mines. The members of the consortia included 26 large enterprises 
whose revenue added up to more than 900 billion RMB, 18 top universities and 9 
research institutions. The government intended to upgrade the industry-academy 
cooperation in the four sectors from the loose and simple form of contracting projects to 
more sophisticated forms of strategic alliances. The consortia would establish joint 
R&D funds and leverage the research centres affiliated to develop critical technologies 
addressing the challenges that the sectors were facing.  
 
The Chinese innovation policies outlined above are representative of the efforts of the 
government in designing and implementing effective innovation policy to promote 
economic and social development. It is interesting to compare at this stage some of 
those policies with those pursued in the EU, as in the latter case the innovation policies 
implemented in the different member states have been extensively summarized and 
systematically benchmarked.  
 
On the basis of the EU’s “Trend Chart on Innovation in Europe” it is possible to provide 
a general and succinct overview of the differences between Chinese and EU countries’ 
innovation policy practice (Table 2). As an informative background, we have 
summarized in Table 3, a couple of selected R&D and innovation indicators 
highlighting the differences and similarities between China, Russia, The EU, the US and 
Japan.  
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Table 2: Comparison of Innovation Policy in China and the European Union Member States 
The EU Trend Chart Innovation Policy Classification 
System 
Policy Category Policy Priority 
Examples of Policy Practices in China 
Education and initial and further 
training 
 
Regulations on Degrees (1980), Compulsory Education Law (1986), Teachers Law (1993), Education Law 
(1995), Vocation al Education Law (1996) and Higher Education Law (1998) demonstrated the Chinese 
government’s legislative efforts since the 1980s. “211 Project” and series of award and training programs 
including Cheung Kong Scholars Program constituted the recent policy actions. However, the education and 
training in China were still insufficiently invested. The further discussion is seen in the section 3.3.1. 
 
Mobility of students, research 
workers and teachers 
 
Policy was co-developed by Ministry of Education and Ministry of Personnel to support foreign experts to 
work in China, to attract overseas Chinese students and scholars to return, and to encourage the placement of 
Ph.D graduate for post doctoral research in enterprises. 
 
Raising the awareness of the larger 
public and involving those 
concerned 
 
China’s legislative authority passed Dissemination of Science and Technology Knowledge Law (2002). The 
government launched the tax preference policy for institutions whose main function is disseminating S&T 
knowledge. Grants were provided to fund the project of increasing public awareness of S&T. 
 
Fostering innovative organizational 
and management practices in 
enterprises 
 
Not Available. 
Public authorities and support to 
innovation policy-makers 
 
Not Available. 
Fostering an 
Innovation Culture 
Promotion of clustering and co-
operation for innovation 
 
Many of the strategies are developed by local governments. For example, the Shanghai municipal government 
cooperated with other neighboring provinces in the Yangtze river delta for coordinating the development of 
the industrial clusters in the region. The similar practice is found in the Pearl river delta region embracing 
Guangdong province, Hong Kong and Macau. 
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Competition 
 
Enactment of Unfair Competition Law (1993), Protecting Consumer’s Rights and Interests Law (1993) and 
Regulations on Anti-dumping and Anti-subsidization (1997), Price Law (1998) revealed the government’s 
legislative efforts. However, the young competition policy regime needs to be improved and strengthened 
(Lin, 2003). 
 
Protection of intellectual and 
industrial property 
 
MOST issued several regulations on IPR protection and exploitation. State Intellectual Property Office 
launched the projects to strengthen the public awareness of IPR protection. However, the IPR policy in China 
needs to be restructured and improved. The further discussion is seen in the section 3.3.2. 
 
Administrative simplification 
 
The regulations of simplifying administration were launched to encourage creation of Newly Technology 
Based Firms and attract FDI. 
 
Amelioration of legal and 
regulatory environments 
 
China’s Legislative actions covered the field of IPR, S&T and education etc. The further discussion is seen in 
the section 3.2.5. 
 
Innovation financing 
 
The Innovation Fund for Small Technology Based Firms was established. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Establishing a 
Framework 
conducive to 
Innovation 
 
 
Taxation 
 
Tax preference policy was implemented to provide incentive to create newly technology based firms and 
attract FDI. However, the current tax preference policy for encouraging innovation in the established 
enterprises did not achieve satisfying performance (Wu, 2003). 
 
Strategic vision of research and 
development 
 
The Chinese central government launched the “2006-2020 Chinese National Science and Technology 
Development Strategy” in March 2006. 
 
Gearing Research to 
Innovation 
Strengthening research carried out 
by companies 
 
Some tax preference policies specifically for some industry sectors were implemented, such as the policy 
encouraging investment in integrated circuit manufacture sector. However, the effect of this type of fiscal 
policy is weak according to Wu (2003). 863 Program increasingly supported industry R&D. In 2002, 30 
percent of the projects financed by the program are implemented in the enterprises (863 Program, 2004). 
Table 2 (Continued)
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Start-up of technology- based 
companies 
 
Numerous policies aimed to promote science parks and incubators and attract overseas Chinese to set up start-
up in China. 
 
Intensified co-operation between 
research, universities and 
companies 
Four R&D and innovation consortiums in the sectors of steel, energy, agriculture and exploration of coal mine 
were established in 2007 with the coordination of central government. 
Strengthening the ability of 
companies, particularly SMEs, to 
absorb technologies and know-how 
Enactment of Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Law (2002) and regulations on venture capital 
development. Establishment of the Innovation Fund for Small Technology Based Firms (IFSTBF). 
Source: European Commission (2000b, 2001b, 2002d). 
Table 2 (Continued)
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Table 3: Science and Technology Indicators for China and Selected OECD and non-OECD Countries  
 China Russia EU 15 Japan US 
Gross Expenditure on R&D (GERD) (Million Current PPP US Dollars)1 72076.8 14190.4 162813.3 96532.3 252938.5
GERD as a Percentage of GDP1 1.29 1.24 1.93 3.09 2.82 
Total Researchers per Thousand Total Employment1 1.1 7.5 5.82 10.2 8.63 
Percentage of GERD Financed by Industry1 57.62 32.92 56.2 73.0 68.3 
Percentage of GERD Financed by Government1 33.42 54.82 34.5 18.5 26.9 
Business Enterprises Expenditure on R&D BERD (Million Current PPP US Dollars) 1 44099.2 9915.7 105121.2 71119.1 188122.8
BERD as a Percentage of GDP1 0.79 0.87 1.062 2.25 1.92 
Number of “Triadic” Patent Families Per Million Population4 0.055 0.490 35.897 89.400 52.712 
Number of Patents Applications to the EPO in the ICT Sector Per Million Population4 0.031 0.320 35.313 60.810 40.337 
Number of Patents Applications to the EPO in the Biotechnology Sector Per Million Population4 0.008 0.095 5.341 4.691 9.634 
Source: OECD (2003c). 
Note: 1. The data for the non-OECD countries without the superscript are the year of 2002. The data for the OECD countries without superscript are the year of 2001. 
2. The data are for 2000. 
3. The data are for 1999.   
4. The data are calculated by the authors. The patent data are for 1998. The Data of Population (1998) except for EU 15 and OECD Average are from World Bank World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database Data Query. The data of EU 15 and OECD Average are from World Urbanization Prospects, the 2001 Revision, United Nations Population Division. 
 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, some areas of China’s innovation policies are today well 
designed; in other areas few policies have as yet been executed to complement the well 
functioning ones so as to further enhance the country’s innovation performance. Two 
areas stand out: human resources and intellectual property.  
 
Education and Human Resources 
 
Directed by the so-called principle of “economic rationalism”, China’s education reform 
since the 1980s through the decentralization of the financial structure and the 
diversification of financial resources has not led to increase the lingering ratio of public 
education investment to total public expenditure. Moreover, the decentralization and 
diversification strategy has given rise to unbalanced education development across the 
eastern and western regions, and between urban and rural area. All of these7, exacerbate 
the development of China’s human capital resources and limits the innovation 
performance of the country in the long run. Furthermore, the gradually declining ratio of 
education appropriation of central governments to that of local government reveals that 
local governments came to assume greater responsibility of education investment than 
before. The crucial decisions such as whether to invest in education, how much to 
invest, in which areas: primary, secondary or tertiary education, depended much on 
local government’s budget plan and the political will of the local leadership. Inevitably, 
the regional and rural-urban discrepancy of education development was widened given 
that after the 1980s the economic growth rates varied to a great extent across different 
regions and also between rural and urban areas (Zhang, 2002; Wang, 2002). 
 
The EU countries are of course far ahead of China in the field of the amount of 
resources devoted to education and human resources development, as reflected both in 
quantitative indicators and the policy focus. But, again there are clear similarities 
between the problems confronting China and the EU. Education has remained in the EU 
the sole responsibility of member states with substantial differences in the amount of 
public resources devoted to education and more generally human resource development, 
particularly when some of the richer Nordic Scandinavian countries are compared with 
some of the new entrants such as Romania and Bulgaria. Furthermore in many 
European countries the participation of women and minority groups in higher education 
is still low. As discussed in the previous section, the EU is also confronted with major 
demographic problems which question its long term growth and the long term 
sustainability of the availability of its human resources.  
 
                                                 
7 As mentioned before, thanks to the Chinese government’s effort in past decade, the education legislative 
system was already established early on in China. However, both government and non-government 
parties, including school, students and parents, frequently challenged these education law and regulations 
(Law, 2002). The “Decision on Education System Reform” announced in 1985 stipulates that the 
governments of various levels are obliged to maintain the growth of the investment to education. The 
growth of education expenditure of government at various levels is required to be faster than the growth 
of fiscal revenue. However, the growth rate of total education appropriation of central and local 
governments in 1996 and 1997 were still lower than that of budgetary revenue, even the obligation was 
reiterated in the subsequent policy documents such as “Strategy of China’s Education Reform and 
Development” announced in 1993. From 1999 to 2001 the central government itself failed to fulfil this 
obligation (Table 5). In most of the years in the 1990s, China’s fiscal appropriation to education 
continuously grew with a lower rate compared with the growth of the budgetary revenue. 
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In short there are opportunities here for win-win situations. The EU will as we argued in 
the previous section have to rely increasingly on foreign talent; China on the other hand 
has not succeeded yet in bringing its education level in some of the less developed 
regions and provinces up to world standards.      
 
Protection of Intellectual and Industrial Property 
 
Since the 1990s the issue of protection of IPR has not only been an economic and 
juridical dilemma for China’s central and local governments, it has also represented a 
significant economic concern for international business and political concern for many 
governments of developed countries. The piracy problem in China has provoked much 
dispute between the Chinese government and its western counterparts, particularly 
between China and the US (Oksenberg et al., 1996). Estimates of piracy and 
infringement of IPR in China are only available from industry interest group such as 
International Intellectual Property Alliance and Business Software Alliance. Because of 
the lack of the third party’s supporting statistics, the estimated figures issued in their 
annual reports should be assessed carefully. According to Business Software Alliance 
(2003), China’s piracy rate showed modest improvement since 1994. Nevertheless, 
China had still the second highest piracy rate, i.e. 92 percent, in the world after 
Vietnam.  
 
In their in-depth analysis of China’s IPR protection issue from the perspective of 
politics and law, Oksenberg et al. (1996) examine the cultural and historical tradition of 
the IPR protection in China. They blame the Confucian tradition and the policy of the 
government in most of the time of the 20th century, particularly in the Mao Era (1949-
1976) for China’s piracy problem. Bearing in mind that China aims to foster innovation 
activities in national R&D institutions and build up the technological competitiveness of 
domestic enterprises in the international market, improving the IPR system and 
enforcing IPR protection are the unavoidable choices for China’s policy makers.  
 
Contrary to the US who has, in line with its industry interest in the software and content 
sectors, been very vocal about China’s IPR infringements, the EU could take a more 
cooperation attitude on this manner, helping China in establishing an IPR system more 
in line with the European tradition than with the US one. In doing so, the EU could 
bring to the forefront the need for open access to science and other forms of “creative 
commons” and open source, rather than allowing, under US (business) interests, 
intellectual property to become enlarged to include an increasing number of activities 
beyond industrial artefacts. The policy discussions in Europe on a number of 
controversial issues such as the so-called software patent (computer implemented 
inventions), would be areas in which mutual insights and exchanges could form a basis 
for a common IPR regime between the EU and China.  
To summarize, by recognizing the importance of investments in human resource and 
R&D, better protection of intellectual property rights and supporting indigenous R&D 
and innovation efforts, China’s central government seems to follow its own adapted 
ambitious Lisbon strategy (March 2006) for nurturing ‘home-grown’ innovation over 
the next decades. The concrete goals set in the blueprint for 2006-2020 include bringing 
the ratio of gross expenditure on R&D to GDP to 2.5 percent in 2020, seeing 
technological progress contribute 60 percent of economic growth, growing business 
expenditures in R&D to twice as much as expenditures on technology transfer (as the 
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degree of dependence on foreign technology will become reduced below the level of 30 
percent), and increasing the number of invention patents granted to Chinese citizens and 
the citation of international scientific papers so that both will rank among the top five in 
the world (State Council, 2006).  
In this sense both the EU and China are focusing on the same broad strategy of bringing 
economic development and social welfare to their citizens, no matter whether they will 
actually fully achieve the goals set out in their respective Lisbon strategies. The scope 
for mutual learning, for mutual advice for win-win opportunities is without any doubt 
high.  
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Conclusions 
Fifty years after the creation of what became the European Union, there is an urgent 
need for a new European Lisbon Agenda, preparing the EU for globalization. It should 
address as a matter of priority the international, external challenges with which Europe 
is likely to be confronted in the decades to come. Above in section 2, we listed on the 
side of the EU three areas which should be central in such a new, external Lisbon 
strategy: international trade in services, internationalization of research networking, 
access to brains and talent. The most recent survey on Western multinationals with their 
headquarters in the US and Europe revealed that about 70 percent of the respondents 
expected an increase in R&D employment in China in the next three years, and some 40 
percent anticipated an expansion in India (Thursby and Thursby, 2006). As 
geographical boundaries have become blurred with regard to the R&D activities of such 
MNEs, the generation and diffusion of advanced knowledge will not be restricted 
merely in the developed world, but will increasingly take place in emerging economies 
such as Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
Surprisingly when looking in somewhat more detail at China, it appears that the country 
has in a certain way its own Lisbon agenda with its own priorities and challenges. As 
argued in section 3, the governments in emerging economies such as China strived to 
absorb globally advanced technology, knowledge and talents by welcoming a huge flow 
of foreign investment and provide incentives to domestic and foreign firms to innovate 
within its geographical territory, a strategy very much reminiscent of Europe’s own 
internal Lisbon agenda. And just as in the case of the EU, the goals set out in the 
Chinese indigenous innovation strategy for 2006-2020 emphasize the contribution of 
technological progress to economic development, of R&D activities in enterprises and 
knowledge creation more generally to society. The selected specific Chinese policy 
challenges briefly reviewed in section 3: the regional disparity, the industrial 
transformation and the deepening of industry-academy relationship will undoubtedly 
spur the knowledge production and exploitation in China as much as they would do in 
Europe. In short the scope for comparative study, for mutual learning from each others’ 
experience, even for joint initiatives, is substantial.  
As we have tried to show here, the time has come for the EU to reposition Lisbon as 
Europe’s natural historical “gate” to the rest of the world: the starting point of an 
externally oriented Europe as opposed to the Europe of the old Rome Treaty whereby 
Rome represents in a certain way also historically the internally oriented Europe of the 
last 50 years. Such repositioning of Lisbon will have to recognize more than ever that 
innovation and the shifts in global demand taking place today, have to play a central 
role in European and in national debates about the allocation of resources to science and 
technology, about knowledge access and diffusion, about innovation.  
Given the increasingly global nature of the social, economic, environmental, 
demographic problems Europe is currently confronted with, a unilateral focus on the 
strengthening of knowledge and innovation activities carried out within Europe with the 
aim of improving European competitiveness reflects in a certain way a somewhat out-
dated “Eurocentric” approach. It does not do justice to the much broader societal and 
global impact on European citizen’s welfare exerted by knowledge accumulation. In a 
growing number of research fields, European welfare will in the long term be directly 
influenced not so much by the development of local knowledge, its international 
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commercial exploitation and intellectual appropriation, but by global access to such 
knowledge, the development of joint global standards and the rapid world-wide 
diffusion of such new technologies to other, non-EU countries.  
The need for a shift in thinking and policy making towards the external dimensions of 
Lisbon is, in other words, essential. In a certain sense, this need should not so much be 
based on the actual facts and figures on the growing intensity of the EU’s external 
relationships in trade, financial, investment or knowledge flows, whatever the dramatic 
growth of such flows since Lisbon 2000, but on opportunities and similar global 
challenges. The global challenges confronting Europe and China, we believe call for 
shared solutions. Shared solutions in the creation of new knowledge and the diffusion of 
existing knowledge addressing some of the most urgent global problems: climate 
change and sustainable development; infant mortality, infectious diseases, HIV and 
more broadly health; water access and desertification; poverty and malnutrition, 
urbanization and rural development. From this perspective the need for the 
externalization of European member states’ Lisbon knowledge strategy can be easily 
summarized. What is today probably least needed, yet most funded, is intra-European, 
and more broadly “North-North” shared research; by contrast what is most needed in 
view of the global problems listed above, is North-South shared research and 
knowledge diffusion. 
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